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Price Fixing and the Illegal Per Se Concept-Blue Cross of Virginia
v. Commonwealth
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act declares every contract in restraint of trade
to be illegal.' The early decisions construing this act interpreted the
language literally.2 Since this interpretation would have invalidated nearly
all contracts used in the normal course of business, the test was relaxed
to a rule of reason Henceforth, the only restraints violative of the Sherman Act were those operating to the prejudice of the public interest by
causing undue interference with the free flow of trade.' The court soon
recognized certain actions as being illegal per se 5 because of their total
I "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
the restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal." Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
2In defense of its agreement to control prices, an association of freight shippers
argued if all contracts which tended to restrain trade were declared illegal, the public
would be prejudiced by the adverse effect of such a decision on the industry. The
Court recognized this argument but felt that competition described by the defendants
as ruinous would in fact be beneficial to the public. The Court further holds that in
light of the intent expressed by Congress any attempt to exclude from the operation
of the Sherman Act "reasonable restraints of trade" would amount to judicial legislation in which the Court could not indulge. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). Cited with approval in United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n,
171 U.S. 505 (1898).
3See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
4
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Government, relying
on the Trans-Missouri Freight decision, supra note 2, argued that the Sherman Act
embraced every contract leaving no room for interpretive judgment by the court but
imposing a duty to limit actions within the context of the literal language of the
statute. Adherence to this test could lead to one of two conclusions-first would be
that every interstate combination was within the statute and therefore destructive of
the right to contract for any purpose concerned with interstate commerce. The other
conclusion being that since the statute fails to state the actions to which it relates, its
enforcement would be impossible because of its uncertainty. It becomes apparent that
Congress intended to limit the contracts prohibited by the Sherman Act and in the
absence of any clearly defined test, the common law test, which was the rule of
reason, would be the only plausible one to adopt. The court did not overrule the
Trans-Missouri case but finds that notwithstanding the general language used, the
final determination of the combinations illegality was justified by the unreasonableness
of the combinations involved.
5The per se concept developed over a period of time. The courts gradually took
cognizance of the fact that throughout the volume of cases handled certain restraints
were being held void with a predictable regularity, but these restraints came to be
classed as illegal because of their nature or illegal per se. See United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Here the court laid the groundwork for the test
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lack of benefit to the public. Among those classed as such have been group
boycotts,' territorial limitations' and price fixing combinations.8
The legality of an alleged price fixing agreement was determined by the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the recent case of Blue Cross of
Virginia v. Commonwealth.' Blue Cross had developed a plan to supply
its subscribers with pre-paid out-of-hospital prescription drugs."0 The subscriber was not to be reimbursed for his drug purchases, but instead Blue
Cross had agreed with the individual pharmacist to pay him directly for
any prescription filled.'1 In order to hold the ultimate cost of the drugs
to a minimum, while keeping the administrative burdens of the program
within reason, the pharmacist's remuneration was to be based on his cost plus
a fixed professional fee.' 2 In affirming a State Corporation Commission
but failed to specifically set it out. The defendant tried to argue that the fixed prices
themselves were reasonable. In rejecting this contention, it was the control over the
market and the potential hazards incident to such power which was found to be
objectionable. See also, Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
The court stated that, without more, price fixing was an unreasonable restraint based
on the fact that such agreements eliminated competition. Id. at 458. The per se
concept was clearly set out for the first time in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940): "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the
price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." Id. at 223.
6See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
7
See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 389 U.S. 365 (1967); United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timkem Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,

341 U.S. 593 (1951).
8

See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United
States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956); United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
9 Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 176 S.E.2d 439 (1970).
10For additional premiums paid by the subscriber Blue Cross proposed to issue

endorsements to the existing hospital service contracts guaranteeing their customer
prescription drugs. Blue Cross was contracting with the customer to supply the drugs
and not for some insurance type reimbursement plan.
11 In the contracts with the individual pharmacist Blue Cross proposed to pay the
pharmacist for prescriptions filled for subscribers. If a subscriber obtained a prescription from a non-cooperating pharmacist, Blue Cross had agreed to pay 75% of the
normal charge. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 211 Va.
180, 176 S.E.2d 439 (1970).
12This method of payment was found to be violative of the anti-trust laws for
reasons more complex than simply the fixed prices between Blue Cross and the
pharmacists. There was evidence introduced that while Blue Cross stated it wished to
keep the cost of drugs to a minimum, the settled professional fee raised the average
cost eight cents per prescription on a state-wide basis. There was also testimony from
at least one pharmacist that he planned to begin charging all his customers by this
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ruling, 3 the court relied on the per se concept as espoused by the federal
courts and held the method of establishing the pharmacist's payment violative of anti-trust law.'"
According to one line of cases,' 5 apparently disregarding the philosophy
of the anti-trust law'" and the reasons given for the per se test," the
professional fee scale thereby indicating that the increase from the fixed prices would
effect the public in general. See Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 184, 176
S.E.2d 439, 441 (1970).
13 In an ex parte decision of November 29, 1967, the State Corporation Commission
approved Blue Cross' contracts with the pharmacists, but on a complaint from a
pharmacist, a review of the plan was ordered on December 9, 1968. The hearing was
held before the Commission February 25, 1969, and a decision was on May 5, 1969,
without having offered the parties an opportunity for oral argument. The contracts
were held void on two grounds. First, the direct payment to the pharmacist was not
authorized by the statutes establishing Blue Cross. See VA. CODE ANN. §S 32-195.1 to
-195.20:1 (1969). The Commission offers in support of its result by way of conclusion
that the contracts fix prices which "apparently" is a per se violation of federal and
Virginia anti-trust statutes. Opinion of State Corporation Commission of May 5, 1969,
Case No. 18652.
14 Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
1S See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United
States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Segram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
16 The thought behind the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was to protect the
public from the evils of monopolies. The country had been experiencing its most
prolific period of industrialization, during which time the governmental attitude had
been one of encouraging the growth of large enterprises. In the late 1880's a change
in attitude emerged and government now felt that corporations had grown to such an
extent that any further growth would be injurious to the public interest. See Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911):
[Tihe main cause which led to the legislation [Sherman Act] was the thought
that it was required by the economic conditions of the times, . . . and the
widespread impression that their [the trusts] power had been and would be
exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally. Id. at 50.
Congress wished to prevent the evils attendant to monopolies while at the same time
not impeding the flow of trade necessarily involved in the course of normal business.
See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933):
[Tihe purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to prevent undue restraints of
interstate commerce, to maintain its apropriate freedom in the public interest,
to afford protection from the subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic
endeavor. Id. at 359.
For this reason Congress prohibited those contracts which restrained trade and tended
to inhibit a freely competitive atmosphere. Contracts were to be illegal because
[t]hey had not been entered into . . . with the legitimate purpose of reasonably
forwarding personal interest and developing trade, but on the contrary were of
such a character as to give rise to the inference or presumption that they had
been entered into or done with the intent to do wrong to the general public and
to limit the right of individuals, thus restraining the free flow of commerce ....
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
7The per se concept was founded upon the basis of decisions all of which dealt with
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legality of an agreement is determined solely on the basis of its effect on
the market."8 If the result is price fixing, the agreement is illegal regardless of any attempted justification. 9 Coexistent with this line of authority are cases20 which base their decisions on the public policy underlying the anti-trust laws2' and draw a distinction between a valid purpose
the furtherance of some purely private economic gain while at the same time being
devoid of any public benefit. Attempts have been made to clothe these motives in the
same palatable service to the public but the courts have recognized these as false justifications since for the most part the proposed "benefit" was very slight if present at all. It
was this established history of industry's actions which facilitated the inception of the per
se test, and the same conspicuous absence of justifications in the subsequent cases which
has entrenched the per se concept so firmly that a court might easily be lulled into
overlooking that "per se" violations may still be legal. To be violative of the anti-trust
laws the restraint must be unreasonable (granted some are per se unreasonable), but
it must also fail to benefit the public in such a manner as to outweigh the unreasonable
effects.
[Tlhere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or business excuse for their use. This principle
of per se unreasonableness ... makes the type of restraints which are proscribed
by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned ....
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
1 Since so many of the cases have failed to present any valid justifications, the
courts seem to go directly to a determination of the agreement's effect on the market
and, upon finding objectionable consequences, hold the agreement to be violative of
the Sherman Act. This practice has led to such general statements as price fixing is
illegal per se regardless of any good motives on the part of parties. See United States
v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 310 (1956). The test has come to be, if the
effect of the action is within the prohibited class, then it is illegal without looking to
anything else.
19 Price fixing is contrary to the policy of competition underlying the Sherman Act
and its illegality does not depend on a showing of its unreasonableness, since it
is conclusively presumed to be unreasonable. It makes no difference whether the
motives of the participants are good or evil; . . . or whether the effect of the
agreement is to raise or to decrease prices. Id. at 309-10.
The "motives" referred to which have been held not to justify price fixing agreements
are all business motives. Good intentions with respect to prices being reasonable has
been disallowed. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). See
also Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). Ethyl Gas Corporation
argued that their price fixing agreements were valid because of the public benefit served.
r'he contracts were held illegal but only after the court found Ethyls business was the
object of any intended benefit. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940). The court rejected the argument that the public benefited from
reduction of "competitive evils" in the industry, holding that any benefit to the public
only be incidental to the invalid business purposes served.
would
2
OSee Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Board
of 21Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
See notes 16-17 supra.
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and an invalid justification. A combination may effectuate fixed prices
and still be legal if the undesirable result is ancillary to a valid purpose.2 Before the per se test can be applied both the purpose and effect of an
agreement must be to fix prices."3
24
Even though the Virginia court purported to adopt the latter test,

it did not accurately apply the test to the facts. After an extended
discussion, it determined the effect of the contracts, 25 but then assumed
the contracts were intended for the same purpose. 26 The existent public
service was overlooked,27 and Blue Cross' explanation as to the necessity
22The argument in favor of the legality of a specific restraint of trade centering
around the elimination of competitive evils was first advanced in the Trans-Missouri
case, supra note 2. In this case as well as the Socony-Vacuwm case, supra note 18,
the court held the contracts to be void despite the reasoning advanced. However, an
otherwise per se illegal trade association was upheld because it cured many evils of the
ailing coal industry. See Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). A
large number of coal producers in a three state area banned together and established
an exclusive selling agent which controlled all prices and sales for the group. The
court notes that competition between the producers has been eliminated but feels this
result is justifiable in this case. The coal industry at that time was about to collapse.
The industry had over expanded the demand; there had been a growth in the use of
substitute fuels; and there had developed a large number of evil and destructive
practices among the producers. The court sees the interests of the producers and the
consumers as interdependent. If this combination was not allowed, many producers
would fail and such failures would greatly increase unemployment and effectively
prostrate the many communities dependent upon their profitable production. The court
reasoned:
The mere fact that the parties to an agreement eliminate competition betnveen
themselves is not enough to condemn it ....
The question of the application of
the statute [Sherman Act] is one of intent and effect, and is not to be determined
by arbitrary assumptions. It is therefore necessary in this instance to consider...
other matters affecting the public interest in interstate commerce . . . . Id. at
360-61.
23 "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of . . . fixing [prices] . . . is illegal per se." United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
24 Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 192, 176 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1970).
25The court meticulously reasoned that the contracts did involve price fixing. The
arguments advanced by Blue Cross as to their position in the overall program and as
to the effect of their unilateral setting of the "professional fee" were overcome. It was
concluded that the contracts had the effect of horizontally fixing prices. Blue Cross
v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 189, 176 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1970).
26After its discussion of the effect of the contracts, the court brought the contracts
under the test set out in Socony-Vacuwn by stating as a conclusion that the contracts
had the purpose and effect of fixing prices. This was the only mention of "purpose."
See Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 192, 176 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1970).
27 Blue Cross had noted that between 1966 and 1968 the national yearly per capita
expenditure for out-of-hospital prescription drugs more than doubled, with the greatest
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of adopting this type payment plan28 was dismissed as an invalid business
justification. Had the court followed its own test and recognized the public
benefit involved, the decision might have been different.2"
As an additional reason for holding the agreements with the pharmacist
void, the court found them to be in violation of the Virginia anti-trust
statutes.3" This conclusion was reached "for the same reasons we have set
forth with respect to the Sherman Act."'" The court was relying on the
understanding that the Virginia and corresponding federal statutes are
to be construed as being identical. 2 This concept may no longer be valid,"3
therefore such cursory treatment was inappropriate.
burden falling on the elderly. The third largest health expenditure is for prescription
drugs while only 20% of the bill was covered by some type of health coverage as
compared with 71% of hospital bills being covered. The need for such a plan is
apparent and this need was intended to be fulfilled by Blue Cross' program. See Brief
for Appellant at 2, Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 176 S.E.2d 439 (1970).
28Blue Cross felt that if some other method of payment were used, the plan would
necessarily collapse under its own burden of administrative detail and cost. Id. at 25.
This statement was taken as a business justification but in light of the fact that Blue
Cross is a non-profit organization, it could not be motivated by a desire to maximize
profits. Blue Cross recognized a need and realized for any plan to be feasible it would
have to be based on the cost-plus professional fee concept.
29Had the court recognized a valid service to the public as a goal of Blue Cross,
the per se concept should not have been its only consideration. The contracts would
still have been within the per se class but would only have been illegal if the court
further determined them to be unreasonable restraints. Reasonableness must be decided
by balancing whatever beneficial purpose was present, see supra note 27, with the
postulated effect on competition and any public policy determinations, see infra note 37.
The policy considerations should be weighted heavily since restraints on trade were
prohibited initially on the basis of their contravention of public policy. Only if the
restraints were so injurious as to outweigh the benefits promoted could the contracts
be held violative of the Sherman Act.
3ovA- CODE ANN. § 59.1-22 to -41 (1968).
31 Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 192, 176 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1970).
32 ,... [ilt appears that our legislature, in a general way, intended that those code
provisions noted should be so construed as to place them, as near as may be, in line
with Federal anti-trust laws...." Norfolk Motor Exch. v. Grubb, 152 Va. 471, 477, 147
SE. 214, 216 (1929).
33
VA. CODE ANN. § 59-40 (1950):
This chapter shall apply only to those trusts, combinations and monopolies
which are unreasonable or inimical to the public welfare, as hereinbefore defined,
and are prohibited and penalized under the provisions of any law of the United
States if their activities extended to interstate as well as intrastate commerce
(emphasis added).
By an amendment to this section in 1950 the italicized portion was deleted. A case
interpreting the new section questions the comparison previously drawn between the
federal and Virginia antitrust statute. See note 31 supra.
By the 1950 amendment to § 59-40 the Anti-monopoly Act was divorced from and
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The Virginia statutes make it quite clear that only unreasonable restraints of trade or those which are inimical to public welfare are to be
invalid," but there is no indication as to what is reasonable. 5 In light of
the substantial purpose for the contracts,36 even if the federal law were
controlling, the same criticism lies for the court's failure to weigh the
public interest being served against the restraint imposed.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals based its decision on policy
determinations37 and ineptly avoided using such reasons to support their conclusion, while it is exactly these reasons which should have been advanced.
In so doing, they added to the confusion concerning the federal per se
concept. Also, the terse dismissal of Virginia law leaves many questions
unanswered. The derth of litigation in this area should have prompted an
analysis of and some determination as to exactly which restraints of trade
are to be considered violations of the Virginia statutes.
F.P.W.

made independent of related Federal Acts, and its application was broadened to
embrace all trusts and monopolies which are unreasonable or inimical to the
public welfare as defined by the Virginia Act itself. Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch,
198 Va. 94, 99; 92 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1956).
34
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-41 (1968).
35 A trust is defined as a combination which has price fixing as its purpose. VA.
CODE ANN. § 59.1-22 (1968). Any trust, as has been defined, is declared unlawful and
against public policy. VA. CODE AN. § 59.1-23 (1968). The application of these provisions has been limited to only unreasonable trusts. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-41 (1968).
86
See note 27 supra.
37 Since these reasons were not discussed, any attempt at a definitive list would be
pure speculation. There are several factors that were brought to the attention of the
court which might have been influencial in the determination of the case. Blue Cross
had stated that it hoped to keep the ultimate cost of the drugs at a minimum, yet it
appears that over 80% of the eligible pharmacists enjoyed an average increase in price
of 4.5% over competitive prices. See Brief for the Appellee at 27, Blue Cross v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 176 S.E.2d 439 (1970). Also, there seems to be some
indication that Blue Cross' status as a "non-profit" organization is in name only, casting
some serious doubts on any non-commercial purpose given for the contracts. Id. at 30.

